Attacking the Marketplace of Ideas: The Wisconsin Campus Free Speech Act by McAvaddy, Patrick
Seton Hall University 
eRepository @ Seton Hall 
Law School Student Scholarship Seton Hall Law 
2019 
Attacking the Marketplace of Ideas: The Wisconsin Campus Free 
Speech Act 
Patrick McAvaddy 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.shu.edu/student_scholarship 
 Part of the Law Commons 
2 
 
Attacking the Marketplace of Ideas: The Wisconsin Campus Free Speech Act 
Patrick R. McAvaddy* 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 On November 16, 2016, conservative public speaker Ben Shapiro appeared on the 
campus of the University of Wisconsin.1  The conservative organization Young Americans for 
Freedom invited Shapiro to speak at an event entitled “Dismantling Safe Spaces: Facts Don’t 
Care About Your Feelings.”2  Most audience members came to hear the speech, but a vocal 
minority came to prevent Shapiro from speaking.3  These protestors repeatedly interrupted the 
speech with shouts of “shame” and “safety.”4  They even managed to silence Shapiro for a brief 
time.5  Meanwhile, audience members supporting Shapiro countered with chants of “free speech 
matters.”6  After several minutes the protestors left on their own accord.7  After the protestors 
left, Shapiro finished his lecture without further interruption.8 
 The incident at the University of Wisconsin ended relatively peacefully and the speaker 
successfully delivered his speech.  However, other protests of conservative speakers at college 
campuses have turned violent.  One of the worst escalations occurred at UC Berkeley, the 
birthplace of the 1964 Free Speech Movement.9  On February 1, 2017, student protestors 
 
*J.D. Candidate, 2019, Seton Hall University of Law; B.A., 2016, The College of New Jersey.  
1 Katie Cooney, Conservative Pundit Ben Shapiro Lectures to Turbulent Crowd on Safe Spaces, Freedom of Speech, 
THE BADGER HERALD (Nov. 17, 2016), https://badgerherald.com/news/2016/11/17/conservative-pundit-ben-shapiro-
lectures-to-turbulent-crowd-on-safe-spaces-freedom-of-speech. 
2 Id. 
3 Id. 
4 Id. 
5 Id. 
6 Cooney, supra note 1. 
7 Id. 
8 Id. 
9 The Free Speech Movement erupted at UC Berkeley after university officials forbade Civil Rights activists from 
setting up information tables. The movement involved massive sit-ins and protests over university policies including 
restrictions on political activity. After several confrontations between activists and police, and in light of the 
growing attention the movement was receiving, university faculty voted to end all restrictions on political activity. 
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gathered in anticipation of a speech by right-wing commentator Milo Yiannopoulos.10  Initially, 
the protests remained peaceful.11  Unfortunately, roughly “150 masked agitators” arrived and 
began throwing rocks at police.12  The police sought to monitor the protests and maintain order.13  
The violence escalated, as agitators hurled Molotov cocktails and smashed windows.14  These 
masked agitators also harassed several students, and injured six.15  Eventually, campus officials 
cancelled the event, citing “violence and destruction of property” and “a concern for public 
safety.”16  Afterwards, UC Berkeley issued a statement “condemn[ing] in the strongest possible 
terms the violence and unlawful behavior that was on display and deeply regret[ting] that those 
tactics will now overshadow the efforts to engage in legitimate and lawful protest.”17  The 
statement further declared that “while Yiannopoulos’ views, tactics and rhetoric are profoundly 
contrary to our own, we are bound by the Constitution … to enable free expression across the 
full spectrum of opinion and perspective.”18  
 UC Berkeley condemned the few violent protestors and stressed the importance of free 
speech and tolerance for free expression across the political spectrum.  Despite this 
condemnation, conservative news outlets, pundits, and politicians all seized on this incident. 
They cited it as evidence of an increasing intolerance by liberal student protestors towards 
 
See Richard Gonzales, Berkeley’s Fight for Free Speech Fired Up Student Protest Movement, NPR (Oct. 5, 2014, 
7:57 AM), https://www.npr.org/2014/10/05/353849567/when-political-speech-was-banned-at-berkeley. 
10 Madison Park and Kyung Lah, Berkeley Protests of Yiannopoulos Caused $100,000 in Damage, CNN (Feb. 2, 
2017, 8:33 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/02/01/us/milo-yiannopoulos-berkeley/index.html.  
11 Id. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. 
16 Park and Lah, supra note 10. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
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dissenting conservative viewpoints.19  Yiannopoulos responded to the incident via Twitter.20  He 
suggested that “one thing we do know for sure: the Left is absolutely terrified of free speech and 
will do literally anything to shut it down.”21  Secretary of Education Betsy DeVos also weighed 
in.22  DeVos called on state legislators and those in charge of funding public universities to 
threaten universities with negative consequences if they are unable to prevent further incidents.23  
Even President Donald Trump expressed frustration.24  He tweeted “if U.C. Berkeley does not 
allow free speech and practices violence on innocent people with a different point of view – NO 
FEDERAL FUNDS?.”25 
 But the fallout was not limited to newspaper opinion columns, talk radio, or Twitter.  
State lawmakers across the country have proposed, and in some cases ratified, campus free 
speech bills.26  The scope of such legislation varies by state.  Some merely reaffirm First 
Amendment protections.27  Some create policies that “push[] schools to more aggressively police 
those who disrupt campus events.”28  Of all the bills, however, the most ambitious and 
controversial comes from Wisconsin.  
 
19 See, e.g., Goldberg: UC-Berkeley Should be Ashamed of Itself, FOX NEWS (Feb. 2, 2017), 
http://video.foxnews.com/v/5307940667001/?#sp=show-clips (“the way the left operates is they just try to shout 
down anybody who disagrees with them. These campuses are basically these little soft-totalitarian states where 
disagreement is actually a heresy”); Rush Limbaugh, Stupid Leftist Protests Have No Impact, THE RUSH LIMBAUGH 
SHOW (Feb. 2, 2017), https://www.rushlimbaugh.com/daily/2017/02/02/stupid-leftist-protests-have-no-impact 
(declaring that “students at these universities, Berkeley being the most recent, they are just so scared, so frightened 
of anybody showing up that is going to say anything that they don’t agree with … they start burning down buildings 
and destroying property and trying to injure people in order to show their dissatisfaction over this guy coming to 
campus to make a speech”).  
20 Park and Lah, supra note 10. 
21 Id. 
22 Lauren Camera, Campus Free Speech Laws Ignite the Country, US NEWS (July 31, 2017, 5:40 PM), 
https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/articles/2017-07-31/campus-free-speech-laws-ignite-the-country 
23 Id. 
24 Park and Lah, supra note 10. 
25 Id. 
26 Camera, supra note 22 (citing states that have passed such laws including North Carolina, Colorado, Tennessee, 
Utah, and Virginia, as well as states that have proposed such laws including California, Illinois, Michigan, Texas, 
and Wisconsin). 
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
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The Wisconsin Campus Free Speech Act establishes a disciplinary system to be enacted 
by Wisconsin public colleges and universities. The system purports to “make the state 
university’s campuses more civil for people of all political orientations.”29  Under the Act, 
students may “face a disciplinary hearing if they receive two or more complaints about disruptive 
conduct during a speech or presentation.”30  The administration must then determine if that 
student has “interfer[ed] with the expressive rights of others.”31  If they have, the administration 
must suspend the student for a minimum of one semester.32  A third violation would necessitate 
expulsion.33  The proposed bill also contains provisions requiring schools to (1) “strive to remain 
neutral, as an institution, on the public policy controversies of the day,” (2) annually report 
disciplinary matters related to free expression disruptions, and (3) explain their free speech rules 
and policies at freshman orientations.34   
In June, the bill passed the Wisconsin State Assembly in a 61-36 vote strictly along party 
lines.35  The bill proceeded to the Republican-majority Wisconsin Senate where it currently 
resides.36  If it passes the Senate, the bill will go to Republican Governor Scott Walker.  Walker 
expressed support for the spirit of the bill in April, stating “to me, a university should be 
precisely the spot where you have an open and free dialogue about all different positions … but 
 
29 Derek Hawkins, Wisconsin Lawmakers Advance Bill to Suspend or Expel Students Who Disrupt Campus 
Speakers, WASHINGTON POST (June 22, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-
mix/wp/2017/06/22/wisconsin-assembly-advances-bill-to-suspend-or-expel-students-who-disrupt-campus-
speakers/?utm_term=.fd724c1cb359.  
30 Id. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. (declining to define, or provide examples of, the public policy controversies that universities should strive to 
remain neutral on). 
35 Hawkins, supra note 29. 
36 Nico Savidge, Senate Unlikely to Take Up Republican Campus Speech Bill Before Fall, WISCONSIN’S STATE 
JOURNAL (June 27, 2017), http://host.madison.com/wsj/news/local/education/university/senate-unlikely-to-take-up-
republican-campus-speech-bill-before/article_36252e7a-e13a-5dc0-b92e-21c07869a4f9.html.  
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the minute you shut down a speaker, no matter whether they are liberal or conservative or 
somewhere in between, I just think that’s wrong.”37   
If it becomes law, the Wisconsin Campus Free Speech Act will be one of the most 
comprehensive and severe responses to disruptive campus protest.  As such, the bill warrants 
closer inspection and consideration about its potential impact.   
The bill’s sponsors claim it will protect free speech on college campuses.38  On the other 
hand, the bill’s detractors warn that it will chill such speech.39  This Note examines these 
arguments, and concludes that legislative responses like the Wisconsin Campus Free Speech Act, 
which create speech disciplinary panels based on vague, undefined violations and aggressively 
promote university neutrality, are not the solution.  Such solutions place an emphasis on 
punishing protest speech, rather than promoting the importance of allowing controversial speech.  
They also empower legislatures to intrude into the administration of universities, and hamstring 
professors’ academic freedom.   
Part I provides background on students’ free speech rights in recent decades across the 
United States, and the current state of free speech on college campuses.  Part II looks closely at 
the text of the Wisconsin Campus Free Speech Act.  It examines the arguments from both sides, 
and then Part III analyzes why this Act crosses the line. Finally, Part IV concludes by suggesting 
that rather than look for a legislative solution, campuses should learn from the examples of 
schools like Gettysburg College, which was able to host a controversial speaker without incident 
by promoting more speech and constructive dissent as a response.   
 
37 Hawkins, supra note 29. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. (“Our colleges and universities should be a place to vigorously debate ideas and ultimately learn from one 
another. Instead this campus gag rule creates an atmosphere of fear where free expression and dissent are 
discouraged”). 
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I. BACKGROUND 
The Wisconsin Campus Free Speech Act is the latest chapter in a larger battle between 
students, higher educational institutions, and the government over free speech.  The focus of this 
Note will be on public colleges and universities. Private colleges and universities enjoy a far-
reaching independence from governmental interference in their decision-making.40  Additionally, 
the Bill of Rights does not apply to actions taken by private institutions, even if the school 
receives federal funding.41  Thus any First Amendment discussion regarding private campuses 
would be philosophical only, rather than legal.  Whether public institutions enjoy similar 
independence from governmental interference, and the scope of First Amendment speech 
protections, are less clear and more heavily debated. 
 A. The Development of “Academic Freedom”  
 The relationship between the government and public colleges and universities has 
changed dramatically over much of the twentieth century.  The concept of “academic freedom,” 
which generally describes a range of [add], for public colleges and universities emerged in the 
early 1900s with the American Association of University Professors’ (“AAUP”) 1915 General 
Declaration of Principles.42  In this landmark document, a committee of professors argued for the 
importance and necessity of freedom from political control for faculty at research universities.43  
 
40 Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 650 (1819) (holding that a charter establishing Dartmouth 
College as a private college was essentially a contract between the King and the trustees that was still valid because 
the Constitution prohibits a state from passing laws to impair a contract). 
41 Jimin He, First Amendment on Private Campuses: Amicus, Education & Youth, Freedom of Expression, Racial 
Justice, HARVARD CIVIL RIGHTS – CIVIL LIBERTIES LAW REVIEW (Dec. 1, 2015), http://harvardcrcl.org/first-
amendment-on-private-campuses/#_ftn15. 
42 1915 Declaration of Principles on Academic Freedom and Academic Tenure, AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF 
UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS (1915), https://www.aaup.org/NR/rdonlyres/A6520A9D-0A9A-47B3-B550-
C006B5B224E7/0/1915Declaration.pdf.  
43 Id. at 292 (explaining that academic freedom “comprises three elements: freedom of inquiry and research; 
freedom of teaching within the university or college; and freedom of extramural utterance and action”). 
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The document also highlighted the dangers to state universities.44  According to the document, 
“where the university is dependent for funds upon legislative favor, it has sometimes happened 
that the conduct of the institution has been affected by political considerations; and … the 
menace to academic freedom may consist in the repression of opinions ….”45  In light of this 
menace, the document stressed the importance of academic freedom from governmental 
interference.46 
 This initial statement of academic freedom proved successful and influential.  By 1940 all 
major organizations of higher education in the United States joined the AAUP in crafting a 
“Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure.”47  This Statement solidified a 
united front concerning academic freedom of faculty.48  The Statement declared that “teachers 
are entitled to full freedom in research” and “teachers are entitled to freedom in the classroom in 
discussing their subject.”49   
Both of these documents helped establish the parameters of academic freedom, which in 
these early years existed mainly as an idealistic goal for universities.  In 1940, however, the 
concept of “academic freedom” took on a new legal dimension, appearing for the first time in a 
judicial opinion.  In Kay v. Bd. of Higher Ed., a New York judge ruled against City College, 
setting aside the college’s appointment of Bertrand Russell, a noted philosopher and liberal 
[activist?], to chair their philosophy department, and removing him as a professor entirely.50  The 
 
44 Id. at 297. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. (“an inviolable refuge from such tyranny should be found in the university. It should be an intellectual 
experiment station, where new ideas may germinate.”). 
47 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure, AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY 
PROFESSORS (1940), https://www.aaup.org/file/1940%20Statement.pdf 
48 Id. 
49 Id. at 14. 
50 J. Peter Byrne, The Threat to Constitutional Academic Freedom, 31 J.C. & U.L. 79, 86 (2004) (citing Kay v. Bd. 
of Higher Ed., 18 N.Y.S.2d 821 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1940)). 
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court found that Russell’s hiring was against public policy because he taught doctrines including 
a permissive view of adultery that the Court deemed immoral and in direct conflict with criminal 
laws.51  City College argued that the Board of Higher Education had sole power to select the 
faculty free from review or curtailment by the courts or other agencies.52  However, the judge 
disagreed, determining that such power “cannot be used to aid, abet, or encourage any course of 
conduct tending to a violation of the Penal Law.53  The judge then spoke more generally about 
the relationship between the courts and “academic freedom,” determining that the court would 
not “interfere with any action of the board in so far as a pure question of ‘valid’ academic 
freedom is concerned,” but that “it will not tolerate academic freedom being used as a cloak to 
promote the popularization in the minds of adolescents of acts forbidden by the Penal Law.”54  
The judge concluded by stating “academic freedom does not mean academic license … there are 
norms and criteria of truth which have been recognized by the founding fathers.”55  Thus, in the 
first instance where the judiciary acknowledged the academic freedom of universities to make 
their own decisions, they also stressed that this right could be superseded by public policy 
concerns.  
In 1957, the Supreme Court first upheld the idea of academic freedom.56  Notably, the 
phrase “academic freedom” appears nowhere in the Constitution.  Nonetheless, the Court has 
found constitutional protections based on this principle, while discussing other First Amendment 
principles.  In Sweezy v. New Hampshire, the Court overturned the conviction of a man who had 
spoken at a state university, and later refused to discuss his knowledge of the Progressive Party 
 
51 Kay, 18 N.Y.S. at 822, 827 (citing to several examples of doctrines taught by Russell including that abduction was 
lawful and adultery was attractive and good to the community). 
52 Id. at 829. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
56 Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 238-45 (1957) 
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in New Hampshire with the state Attorney General.57  Most of the opinion focused on the 
infringement of due process rights.58  However, the Court also admonished the state for 
summoning a witness and compelling him, against his will, to “disclose the nature of his past 
expressions and associations.”59 The Court stressed this action violated rights safeguarded by the 
Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, and invaded the areas of academic freedom and 
political expression.60  In a crucial passage, Chief Justice Warren elaborated by providing the 
first look into the Supreme Court’s view of academic freedom: 
The essentiality of freedom in the community of American universities is almost 
self-evident.  No one should underestimate the vital role in a democracy that is 
played by those who guide and train our youth.  To impose any strait jacket upon 
the intellectual leaders in our colleges and universities would imperil the future of 
our Nation … Scholarship cannot flourish in an atmosphere of suspicion and 
distrust.  Teachers and students must always remain free to inquire, to study and 
to evaluate, to gain new maturity and understanding; otherwise our civilization 
will stagnate and die.61 
Justice Frankfurter concurred, writing that academic freedom rested in the institution itself, 
which required “the exclusion of governmental intervention in the intellectual life of a 
university.”62  Thus, without citing to a specific section of the Constitution, the Court suggested 
that the First Amendment protects academic freedom by freeing teaching and scholarship from 
political control.63  Following this decision, the Supreme Court continued to find protections [for 
what]  based upon the idea that academic freedom prohibits political interference on campuses.64 
 
57Id. (The state attorney general had been given broad powers by the legislature to root out Communism by 
interrogating suspected members).  
58 Id. 
59 Id. at 250. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
62 Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 262 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
63 He, supra note 41. 
64 See, e.g., Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 591, 603 (1967) (invalidating New York requirement that 
forced faculty at public universities to sign certificates stating that they were not communists or members of 
subversive organizations because “our Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom … which does 
not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom”). 
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B. Development of Student Rights at Public Colleges and Universities 
The opinion in Sweezy, however, said nothing about extending academic freedom to the 
words and expressions of students.65  Yet, the courts have not been silent on this issue.  Indeed, a 
separate line of cases has explored the relationship between students and their universities to 
determine how much control the institutions may exert. The first major case to tackle this 
question arose in Kentucky.66  In Gott v. Berea College, a local restaurant owner sued Berea 
College after the college prohibited its students from eating at restaurants that the college did not 
control.67  The college insisted that they were the students’ caretakers.68  As such, they had to 
occasionally pass rules to prevent students from wasting their time and money.69  The court 
agreed, and decided that the doctrine of in loco parentis applied.70  In other contexts, courts, 
citing this doctrine granted higher education institutions significant power over their students, 
including with respect to [add].71   
In 1928, a New York appellate court furthered colleges’ and universities’ power over 
student freedom under the in loco parentis principle.72  The case challenged Syracuse 
University’s dismissal of a student because she was not being “a typical Syracuse” girl in that the 
University vaguely claimed she had been causing problems in her sorority house.73  The student 
alleged that the dismissal, though not malicious, was arbitrary and unjust.74  Further, she argued 
 
65 He, supra note 41. 
66 Gott v. Berea College, 156 Ky. 376 (Ky. Ct. App. 1913). 
67 Id. 
68 Id. at 378. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. 
71 In loco parentis literally translates to “in the place of the parents” and represented a belief that colleges and 
universities could make any rule for students that parents could make for their children without courts interfering 
with those decisions. 
72 Anthony v. Syracuse University, 224 A.D. 487, 488-89 (N.Y. App. Div. 1928) 
73 Id. (noting that defendant university had not proffered specific reasons for dismissing plaintiff beyond vague 
rumors they had heard about her causing trouble in her sorority house). 
74 Id. at 489. 
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that a contract existed between her and the University barring the dismissal.75  The court 
acknowledged that “under ordinary circumstances and conditions a person matriculating at a 
university establishes a contractual relationship under which … he is entitled to pursue his 
selected course to completion.”76  However, the court held for Syracuse University and reversed 
the lower court.77  They reasoned that the University had wide discretion in determining their 
“ideals of scholarship” and “moral standards.”78  Therefore, they cautioned, courts should take 
care in disturbing any decision of the University authorities in this respect.79  Thus, another early 
twentieth century court underscored the broad power Universities had to regulate and control 
their students acting in loco parentis.  
Moving forward, the 1950s and 1960s saw dramatic changes in the relationship between 
administrations and their students.  Civil rights and anti-establishment movements dominated 
this period.  Among them was a student-led movement for more rights, which fermented on 
public campuses.  Activists sought the opportunity to be treated as adults.  The movement won a 
huge victory with the landmark federal court decision Dixon v. Alabama.80  This decision 
effectively ended the idea that colleges and universities could act in loco parentis to discipline 
and expel their students.81  In Dixon, Alabama State College, acting in loco parentis, expelled six 
students without a hearing, and for unspecified reasons.82  Statements by members of the State 
Board of Education regarding the incident suggest the students were expelled because of their 
 
75 Id. 
76 Id. at 489-91. 
77 Id. 
78 Anthony, 224 A.D. at 491. 
79 Id.  
80 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961). 
81 Id. 
82 Id. at 152. (occurring after students’ participation in a sit-in demonstration at a segregated lunch grill located in 
the basement of the county courthouse in Montgomery, Alabama). 
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participation in the Civil Rights Movement.83  Initially, the district court found for the College.84  
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit agreed that there are no statutes or rules requiring formal charges or 
a hearing.85   
However, the Court of Appeals noted that the usual practice at Alabama State College 
had been to give students the opportunity for a hearing to present defenses before they could be 
expelled.86  The Court of Appeals further declared that “it is not enough to say … the right to 
attend a public college or university is not in and of itself a constitutional right,” and that “it is 
necessary to consider the nature both of the private interest which has been impaired and the 
governmental power which has been exercised.”87  Indeed, while attendance at public university 
is voluntary and universities retain the power to expel students, students do not waive the 
fundamental right to notice and a hearing.88  The Court of Appeals continued by noting that the 
governmental power to expel students is not unlimited and cannot be arbitrarily exercised.89  
Rather, “there must be some reasonable and constitutional ground for expulsion.”90   
Finally, the Court of Appeals set forth notice and hearing requirements for colleges and 
universities to follow prior to expulsion in order to comply with due process.91  These standards 
included providing students with a statement of the specific charges and grounds, if proven, for 
expulsion.92  In finding these fundamental rights of notice and hearing in public university 
 
83 Id. (noting one board member based his decision solely on plaintiffs violating a law of Alabama promoting 
separation of the races in public places, while another based the decision on the plaintiffs demonstrating without 
permission of the institution). 
84 Id. at 155. (concluding that no statute or rule imposed a notice or hearing requirement before expelling the 
students). 
85 Id. 
86 Dixon, 294 F.2d at 155. 
87 Id. at 156. 
88 Id. at 156-57.  
89 Id. at 157 
90 Id. 
91 Id. at 158. 
92 Dixon, 294 F.2d at 158. 
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expulsion procedures, the Court’s decision in Dixon was instrumental.  It marked a shift away 
from deference of universities acting in loco parentis, and towards a system that recognized 
university students were adults with full rights under the Bill of Rights.   
As part of this shift, the Supreme Court and lower courts began explicitly finding and 
emphasizing student free speech rights on campus.  First though, the Supreme Court decided the 
landmark case Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist..93  This decision involved whether a 
public high school’s suspension of students for wearing armbands to protest the Vietnam War 
violated those students’ First Amendment right to freedom of speech.94  In a 7-2 decision, the 
majority found that the suspension violated the high school students’ free speech rights.95  While 
the case involved high school students, the majority opinion proved to be a harbinger for similar 
holdings involving university and college campuses.96  Famously, the Court declared that neither 
students nor teachers “shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the 
schoolhouse gate.”97 
Additionally, the Court highlighted the extensive breadth of First Amendment protection 
for free speech and expression, stating that under the Constitution, “free speech is not a right that 
is given only to be so circumscribed that it exists in principle but not in fact.”98  The Court 
recognized that the free speech provision of the First Amendment permits “reasonable regulation 
of speech-connected activities in carefully restricted circumstances.”99  However, the exercise of 
 
93 393 U.S. 503 (1969) 
94 Id. 
95 Id. at 514 
96 Id. 
97 Id. at 506. 
98 Id. at 513. (“Freedom of expression would not truly exist if the right could be exercised only in an area that a 
benevolent government has provided as a safe haven for crackpots.”). 
99 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513. 
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these rights is not limited to “a telephone booth or the four corners of a pamphlet, or to 
supervised and ordained discussion in a school classroom.”100  
Finally, the Court stressed that “the vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is 
nowhere more vital than in the community of American schools … [t]he classroom is peculiarly 
the marketplace of ideas.”101  Indeed, the Court recognized that the future depends upon “leaders 
trained through wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas … [rather] than through any kind 
of authoritative selection.”102  The cases that followed regarding public college and university 
students related more closely to the spirit of this holding. 
In Healy v. James, the Court ruled that Central Connecticut State College violated 
students’ First Amendment rights when it denied official recognition to a student group because 
of its viewpoint, thus preventing the group from enjoying certain privileges.103  The school 
denied recognition because the group’s leftist philosophy was allegedly “antithetical to the 
school’s policies.”104  The Court explained that the denial of official recognition to the 
organization, without sufficient justification, violated the students’ First Amendment right of 
association implicitly found in the freedoms of speech, assembly, and petition.105  
Additionally, these First Amendment rights for public university and college students 
were not vulnerable to the same restrictions later applied to high school students.106  Rather, the 
 
100 Id. 
101 Id. at 512. 
102 Id. at 512. 
103 408 U.S. 169 (1972) (The student group, Students for a Democratic Society, cited three reasons for existing: (1) 
providing a forum of discussion for students analyzing American society; (2) bringing about constructive changes; 
and (3) relating the problems of leftist students with other interested groups on campus. The group sought 
recognition against the backdrop of the Vietnam War’s polarizing influence on campuses.).  
104 Id. at 175. 
105 Id. at 181. 
106 See, e.g., Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986) (holding that high school officials have discretion to 
curtail obscene, vulgar, lewd, indecent, or plainly offensive speech in addition to disruptive speech laid out in 
Tinker); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988) (upholding school’s decision to censor certain 
articles in school newspaper because a school does not offend First Amendment by exercising editorial control over 
style and content of student speech in school-sponsored activity as long as actions are reasonably related to 
16 
 
Court reasoned that university students’ First Amendment speech rights are nearly akin to adults 
in broader society.107 They held that: 
The precedents of this Court leave no room for the view that, because of the 
acknowledged need for order, First Amendment protections should apply with 
less force on college campuses than in the community at large. Quite to the 
contrary, “[t]he vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more 
vital than in the community of American schools.” The college classroom with its 
surrounding environs is peculiarly the “marketplace of ideas,” and we break no 
new constitutional ground in reaffirming this Nation’s dedication to safeguarding 
academic freedom.108 
 
The Court acknowledged that reasonable time, place, and manner regulations on speech would 
have to be respected.109  However, the Court asserted that colleges and universities had a heavy 
burden to overcome in restraining student group associational activities.110  Additionally, the 
Court rejected the college’s argument that such groups required their “administrative seal of 
official college respectability.”111   
 After Healy, the Supreme Court continued to enforce First Amendment rights for 
university students that resembled the rights afforded to society at large.112  However, these 
decisions were divided.  Several Justices, in concurring and dissenting opinions, expressed the 
view that First Amendment principles enjoyed by society at large did not, and should not, apply 
 
legitimate concerns and even though the government could not censor similar speech outside the school); Morse v. 
Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007) (determining that principal may restrict student speech at school event when that 
speech is reasonably viewed as promoting illegal drug use).  
107 Healy, 408 U.S. at 180 
108 Id. (quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960)). 
109 Id. at 182. 
110 Id. at 183 
111 Id. at 184. 
112 See, e.g., Papish v. Bd. of Curators, 410 U.S. 667, 670-71 (1973) (holding that school could not punish student 
for the mere dissemination of ideas that were offensive to good taste when the speech could not be labeled as 
constitutionally obscene); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 277 (1981) (holding that universities cannot treat 
students and student groups differently based on their viewpoints even if exclusion allegedly consistent with 
school’s mission); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 836 (1995) (explaining how 
dangerous suppression of student speech on basis of viewpoint is in university setting because “to cast disapproval 
on particular viewpoints … risks the suppression of free speech and creative inquiry in one of vital centers for the 
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completely to higher educational institutions.  Rather, they believed that unique circumstances on 
campuses may influence whether First Amendment principles applied fully.113   
These varied views about the scope of university and college students’ First Amendment 
free speech rights culminated in Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the U. of Cal. v. Martinez, 
where the Court held that a public law school could, without violating the First Amendment, 
stipulate conditions on the granting of school funds to a student group.114  There, a law student 
group at Hastings Law School challenged a requirement from the Law School that any group 
seeking official recognition, access to school amenities, and funds had to follow a very inclusive 
nondiscrimination policy.115  The Law School adopted the policy to further their reasonable 
educational purposes.116  While analyzing the reasonableness of the Law School’s policy, the 
Court suggested a more deferential approach than previously followed.117 It declared that “[o]ur 
inquiry is shaped by the educational context in which it arises, given the ‘special characteristics 
of the school environment.”’118  As such, the Court declined to substitute its own judgment for 
the “on-the-ground expertise and experience of school administrators.”119  Rather, despite any 
misgivings about the wisdom of the policy, the Court deferred to the law school.120  However, 
the 5-4 decision was deeply divided.121  The dissent complained that this deference was 
inconsistent with Healy and other precedential student speech cases.122   
 
113 See, e.g., Bd. of Regents v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 239 (2000) (concluding that “protecting a university’s 
discretion to shape its educational mission may prove to be an important consideration in First Amendment analysis 
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 To date, the Supreme Court has afforded university and college students more First 
Amendment protections than lower public school students.  However, they have also found that 
colleges and universities are entitled to some deference in determining which speech to permit 
based on their educational missions.  Thus, a level of uncertainty remains as to whose First 
Amendment rights should receive more consideration. 
 C. The Current Debate Over Free Speech Rights on Public Campuses 
 In recent years, universities have struggled with trying to balance their obligations under 
the First Amendment, and their desire to create an inclusive atmosphere.  This balancing act has 
been especially difficult in the context of perceived offensive speech.123  Specifically, while 
offensive speech can be controversial in society beyond college campuses, the Supreme Court 
and lower courts have previously protected it, stressing that a law directed against speech found 
offensive to some can be turned against dissenting views to the detriment of all.124  Additionally, 
organizations such as the American Civil Liberties Union have defended the constitutionality of 
offensive speech, arguing that “[t]he First Amendment really was designed to protect a debate at 
the fringes … You need a First Amendment to protect speech that people regard as intolerable or 
outrageous or offensive – because that is when the majority will wield its power to censor or 
suppress….”125   
 
123 See, e.g., Susan Svrluga, Slurs, Blackface, and Gorilla Masks: The Academic Year Opened with Racial Ugliness, 
THE WASHINGTON POST (Oct. 7, 2016) (examining instances of racial incidents on several college campuses and 
contrasting the responses that schools must “create an environment on campus that is open and inclusive and that 
inspires a sense of belonging for all members of our community” with responses that “even this kind of 
contemptible racist speech is protected by the First Amendment”). 
124 See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (holding that the government cannot punish 
inflammatory speech unless the speech meets the very high bar of intentionally and effectively provoking a crowd to 
immediately carry out violent and unlawful action); Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1764 (2017) (arguing that 
“speech that demeans on the basis of race, ethnicity, gender, religion, age, disability, or any other similar ground is 
hateful; but the proudest boast of our free speech jurisprudence is that we protect the freedom to express ‘the thought 
that we hate’”) (quoting United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 655 (1929) (Holmes, J., dissenting)). 
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Despite the importance placed on protecting offensive speech, however, the current trend 
involves college students demanding more censorship of speech they regard as antithetical to the 
goal of inclusivity on campuses.  This approach by student activists has garnered both support 
and criticism. Defenders contend that students “are continuing ‘the American tradition of using 
free expression and civil disobedience to advance social change.’”126  They see the activists 
protecting “the vital imperatives of racial and gender justice that are important not just on 
colleges campuses but in society at large.”127  Additionally, defenders of these activists argue 
that “political life and discourse is at the boiling point with the election of President Trump” and 
as a result, “[some people] may see ‘free speech’ as a cover for attacks on marginalized 
people.”128   
 Conversely, critics depict the activists as “coddled students” who have no tolerance for 
“dissent and offense.”129  Some critics suggest that the students’ intolerance stems from younger 
people growing up less independently than previously.130  As a result, “college has become a 
time of an ‘extended period of adolescence’ rather than a time when students transition to full 
adulthood.”131  Critics also explain this trend towards censorship as the result of “liberal 
intolerance” of conservative ideas.132  These critics highlight studies suggesting that 
 
126 Mary-Rose Papandrea, The Free Speech Rights of University Students, 101 Minn. L. Rev. 1801, 1811 (2017) 
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conservatives are less prevalent in campus faculties and administrations.133  Finally, critics 
charge that universities censor offensive speech on their campuses out of fear that such speech 
may turn away those looking for a more inclusive environment.134  Observers point to “a 
worrying trend in higher education where students ‘have come to act as customers – the ones 
who set the terms, the ones who are always right – and the degree to which they are treated that 
way.”’135   
 Additionally, actual empirical evidence captures university students’ growing view of 
offensive speech as unconstitutional and susceptible to censorship.  John Villasenor, a Brookings 
Institution senior fellow and University of California at Los Angeles professor, recently 
conducted a nationwide survey of 1,500 undergraduate students at four-year colleges.136  The 
survey tested students’ understanding of the First Amendment.137  One of the more notable areas 
of the survey involved how students think offensive speech should be handled.138   
Villasenor first asked general questions regarding what the First Amendment protects.  
He asked whether the First Amendment protects “hate speech.”139  40% incorrectly said no.140  
Villasenor then asked whether the First Amendment requires that “an offensive speaker at a 
public university be matched with one with an opposing view.”141  60% incorrectly answered 
 
133 Id. at 1812. (“We’re fine with people who don’t look like us, as long as they think like us”). 
134 Id. at 1813. 
135 Id. (quoting Frank Bruni, In College Turmoil, Signs of a Changed Relationship with Students, NEW YORK TIMES 
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yes.142  Villasenor then asked more general, philosophical questions regarding what students 
believe would be an appropriate way to handle speech they did not agree with.  He offered a 
hypothetical where a public university planned to host a very controversial speaker, known for 
making offensive and hurtful statements.143  He asked, “would it be acceptable for a student 
group to disrupt the speech by loudly and repeatedly shouting so that the audience cannot hear 
the speaker?”  51% of respondents answered affirmatively.144  Next, Villasenor inquired whether 
it would be acceptable for a student group to use violence to prevent such a controversial speaker 
from talking.145  19% believed that such violence would be justified to prevent the controversial 
speech.146   
Empirical findings such as Villasenor’s study paint a chilling portrait of the attitude 
toward disagreeable speech, and the state of free speech on college and university campuses.  
Offensive speech may be abhorrent and worthy of denouncement but that does not mean that 
such speech is unconstitutional.  And it is vitally important that this distinction remain 
uncompromised.  Indeed, as Justice Kennedy wrote, “a law that can be directed against speech 
found offensive to some portion of the public can be turned against minority and dissenting 
views to the detriment of all. The First Amendment does not entrust that power to the 
government’s benevolence.”147   
The question is what steps could, and should, be taken to promote free speech, even if it 
may be controversial.  One common solution across the country involves legislatively mandating 
that public colleges and universities protect these rights and punish those who infringe upon 
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them.  In this vein, the Wisconsin Campus Free Speech Act may be the most sweeping in its 
scope and in its potential impact.  
II. The Wisconsin Campus Free Speech Act 
 A. Textual Components 
The Wisconsin Campus Free Speech Act would require the Board of Regents of the 
University of Wisconsin System to discard any previous policies on free expression at four-year 
and two-year institutions in Wisconsin.148  Instead, the Board would replace the old policies with 
the policies that stress campus and faculty neutrality towards speech, and establish disciplinary 
procedures addressing speech violations set forth in the bill.149  The first section of the bill 
discusses why the drafters and sponsors believe that such a bill is necessary.150  They view the 
bill as essential to uphold the fundamental importance of free speech.151  The first section also 
establishes several precedential reports discussing the importance of free expression on 
campuses.152  After defining several terms in sections two and three, the fourth section contains 
the elements of the new free expression policy.153  The section stipulates that the Board of 
Regents shall develop and adopt a policy on free expression, no later than 120 days after the 
enactment of the bill.154 This policy must contain at least seven enumerated stipulations.155   
 
148 Wis. Assemb. 299, 2017 Leg., 103rd Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2017). 
149 Id. 
150 Id. at 3. 
151 Id. (“In recent years, institutions have abdicated their responsibility to uphold free speech principles and these 
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Specifically, the policy adopted must reflect that (1) the primary function of a college or 
university is “the discovery, improvement, transmission, and dissemination of knowledge by 
means of research, teaching, discussion, and debate” and “an institution must strive to ensure the 
fullest degree of intellectual freedom and free expression”; (2) colleges and universities are not 
meant to shield students from speech protected by the First Amendment, “including ideas and 
opinions they find unwelcome, disagreeable, or even deeply offensive”; (3) “students and faculty 
have the freedom to discuss any problem that presents itself … as long they do not break the law 
or ‘materially and substantially disrupt the functioning of [the] institution’”; (4) anyone legally 
on campus grounds may protest or demonstrate there, provided that such demonstrations do not 
“interfere with the rights of others to engage in or listen to expressive activity”; (5) Wisconsin 
public college and university campuses “are open to any speaker whom students, student groups, 
or members of the faculty have invited”; (6) public areas of campus “are public forums and open 
on the same terms to any speaker”; and (7) each college or university “shall strive to remain 
neutral, as an institution, on the public policy controversies of the day.”156   
Section four also contains a requirement that colleges and universities must enforce a 
range of disciplinary sanctions for anyone “who engages in violent, abusive, indecent, profane, 
boisterous, obscene, unreasonably loud, or other disorderly conduct that interferes with the free 
expression of others.”157  Examples of permissible sanctions are largely left unspecified.  Still, 
the bill requires that any student who has twice interfered with the expressive rights of others be 
suspended for a minimum of one semester or expelled.158   
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Finally, section four states that “in all disciplinary cases involving expressive conduct, 
students are entitled to a hearing.”159  The bill provides a non-exhaustive list of hearing rights, 
including the right to (1) receive advanced written notice of the charges; (2) review the evidence 
in support of the charges; (3) confront witnesses; (4) present a defense; (5) call witnesses; (6) 
receive assistance of counsel if penalties could include suspension for longer than nine days or 
expulsion; and (7) appeal.160 
Section five requires the Board of Regents to create a “council on free expression 
consisting of no less than 15 members,” tasked with overseeing the implementation and 
enforcement of the new policy.161  Thirteen members shall each represent one of the universities 
encompassing the Wisconsin system.162  Two of the members “shall be the chairpersons of the 
assembly and senate standing committees having jurisdiction over universities as determined by 
the speaker of the assembly and the president of the Senate.”163  The provision establishes an 
element of direct legislative control over the workings of Wisconsin campuses.  
Section five additionally stipulates that the council must annually submit a report to the 
Board of Regents, Governor, and chief clerk of each legislature house.164  This report must 
include (1) a description of any disruptions of free expression during that year; (2) a description 
of the administrative handling and discipline relating to those disruptions; (3) a description of 
any difficulties, controversies, or successes in maintaining institutional neutrality regarding 
political or social issues; and (4) any assessments, criticisms, or recommendations the council 
chooses to make.165   
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Section six addresses freshman orientations.166  Specifically, the section stipulates that 
“each institution shall include in freshman orientation programs a section describing to all 
students the policies and rules regarding free expression” pursuant to this bill.167  Section nine of 
the Act permits institutions to restrict student expression in cases where the expressive activity is 
not protected by the First Amendment.168  Such cases include (1) violations of state or federal 
law; (2) defamation; (3) peer-on-peer harassment; (4) sexual harassment; (5) true threats; (6) 
unjustifiable invasions of privacy; (7) an action that unlawfully disrupts the function of the 
institution; and (8) a violation of a reasonable time, place, and manner restriction.169   
 B. Reactions to the Wisconsin Campus Free Speech Act 
 While the Wisconsin Campus Free Speech Act is not the first act of its kind, it is one of 
the most far-reaching in that [describe why].170  As such, the bill immediately drew strong 
reactions from both proponents and opponents.  The bill’s sponsors promoted it as an answer to 
the string of disruptive protests on college campuses.171  According to lead sponsor 
Representative Jesse Kramer, he did not intend the bill to “micromanage our university system,” 
but instead to “provid[e] a basic framework that protects the constitutional rights of everyone on 
the campus.”172  According to Kramer, the bill provides “penalties for people who are found 
guilty of stomping on someone’s First Amendment rights.”173   
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The bills co-sponsor, Representative Robin Vos, sought to alleviate the concerns of some 
skeptics.  She assured that the bill would provide Wisconsin with some of the strongest measures 
to prevent free speech infringements, and would not affect classroom discussions.174  Vos 
stressed that “college campuses should be the one place where the most honest … open debate 
happens,” and that his bill would help realize this goal.175   
 However, the bill sparked criticism from many who feared that the scope of the bill could 
sweep up [what], and [add].  Wisconsin Representative Lisa Subeck (D-Madison) characterized 
colleges and universities as “place[s] to vigorously debate ideas and ultimately learn from one 
another.”176  She worried that this bill represents a “campus gag rule creat[ing] an atmosphere of 
fear where free expression and dissent are discouraged.”177  Additionally, Wisconsin 
Representative Cory Mason (D-Racine) charged that this bill and its sponsors “hop[e] to neuter 
the university from having any stance on things.”178  As evidence of this, he pointed to the vague 
prohibition on disruptive speech and the requirement of classroom and administration neutrality 
on issues of the day.179  One Wisconsin Representative, Fred Kessler (D-Milwaukee), even 
accused the bill of “returning … to the witch hunt era of Joe McCarthy.”180  Kessler worried that 
the rigid and harsh system of punishment based on complaints would incentivize partisan 
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operatives to attend speeches and file complaints against students with the intention of getting 
them thrown out of school.181   
The vast majority of criticism came from Democratic representatives.  However, some 
Republican members also expressed reservations about the vague scope of the bill.  
Representative Bob Gannon (R-West Bend) expressed concerns that the bill could be used to 
silence conservative students.182  He feared the bill may “intimidate students into silence – 
conservative students into silence.”183  Representative Gannon worried, for example, about the 
effects on conservative students who might want to protest abortion, gun control, or other 
government policies.184   
 
 
III. The Danger of the Wisconsin Campus Free Speech Act  
The main criticisms of the Wisconsin Campus Free Speech Act focus on its potentials to 
(1) chill students’ free speech; (2) create McCarthyism-style witch hunts; and (3) infringe upon 
some of the independence afforded to professors in the classroom and administrators running the 
schools.  These concerns are valid.  Indeed, they would result in a bill at odds with precedent 
concerning the relationship between university and college campuses, students, and the 
government. 
 A. The Act Infringes Upon the Idea of Academic Freedom 
 The requirement in section four that each college or university “shall strive to remain 
neutral, as an institution, on the public policy controversies of the day” should concern 
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professors.  It is at odds with educational institution’s traditional relationship with government 
that allows for a large degree of independence in the classroom.185  Indeed, mandating neutrality 
in a vague manner such as this effectively places the “straight jacket upon intellectual leaders in 
our colleges and universities” that the Court warned against as a threat to academic freedom in 
Sweezy.186  Chief Justice Warren clearly expressed his belief in Sweezy that professorial 
independence is vital to the working of higher education.187  Justice Frankfurter in his 
concurrence went a step further, and denounced any attempts by the government to interfere in 
this classroom autonomy.188   
Furthermore, the Supreme Court stressed in Widmar v. Vincent that its decision would 
not undermine the right of universities, “to determine for [themselves] on academic grounds who 
may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study.”189  
Considering the strong deference afforded universities and professors in deciding what to teach 
and how to teach it, provisions like section four’s neutrality requirement are unjustified and 
unprecedented.  Indeed, they inhibit professors from fully teaching their fields of expertise and 
challenging students to think outside ideas they’re comfortable with if they have any relation to 
current events and debates.  
For example, during debate on the bill, one representative sought to explore the possible 
scope of the bill.  The representative asked whether a professor would be allowed to challenge a 
student under the bill if, hypothetically, “the student in a geology class argued the Biblical theory 
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that the Earth is only 6,000 years old.”190  In response, Representative Kramer asserted that 
“students who felt intimidated from expressing their opinions in class could bring their 
complaints to the Council on Free Expression,” implying that the bill would extend to material 
covered in classrooms.191  This assertion followed Representative Kramer’s declaration that 
Earth was, in fact, 6,000 years old.192  Therefore, not only would the bill infringe on the 
traditional autonomy of professors in their classrooms, but it could also force professors to 
remain quiet when students express beliefs that are not held by professionals in those fields.  All 
for the sake of enforcing aggressive neutrality.   
This rigidity would be devastatingly counterproductive for institutions regarded in the 
past as “the marketplace of ideas.”193  As Dave Vanness, associate professor at the University of 
Wisconsin, pondered during the bill’s hearing, “how are we to be taken seriously as an institution 
of higher learning and research if our professors can be called before a ‘Council on Free 
Expression’ to defend their teaching of geology?”194  It is true that students at universities are 
entitled to their own beliefs regarding issues of today.  However, such beliefs should ideally be 
formed from critical reasoning, and professors should be afforded the opportunity to counter 
incorrect beliefs pertaining to their field of expertise.  Because section four’s neutrality 
requirement is unnecessarily rigid and infringes upon academic freedom it should be removed.   
 B. The Act Could Result in a Chilling Effect on Campus Free Speech 
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 In addition to the neutrality provision, section four of the Act discusses disciplinary 
action.195  The section requires disciplinary action be taken against anyone “who engages in 
violent, abusive, indecent, profane, boisterous, obscene, unreasonably loud, or other disorderly 
conduct that interferes with the free expression of others.”196   
While this may seem like a comprehensive accounting of the type of punishable 
disruption, each term is vague and undefined elsewhere in the bill.  The bill foregoes specificity 
in favor of deferring to fact-specific findings by the Council on Free Expression.197  This 
approach, however, is problematic.  It could result in opportunistic witch hunts, and the silencing 
of otherwise legitimate speech out of fear.  Some proponents of the bill counter that free speech 
would be bolstered because students afraid of being shouted down for their views will feel more 
comfortable speaking.  For example, the Goldwater Institute, a libertarian think tank, supports 
the bill because “it’s so important for universities to be bastions of free speech because the 
university is a place where you can think the unthinkable,” and “if we put artificial guard rails on 
that discussion, we’re all the poorer for it.”198  However, this quote could just as easily be used as 
a caution against government oversight of campus speech.   
Wisconsin’s bill sets out to promote free speech.  However, by vaguely threatening 
punishment based on undefined conduct, it is counterproductive.  It places “artificial guard rails” 
on campus discussions, and threatens to prevent counter-protestors from exercising their rights to 
free speech.”199  As stated by Representative Dianne Hesselbein (D-Middleton), “the bill puts 
[the University of Wisconsin] regents in the position of determining things like ‘how loud is too 
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loud’ and could result in one student’s free speech rights being protected at the expense of 
another’s.”200  Similarly, while the ACLU generally supports efforts to bolster free speech, the 
organization has cautioned against the unintended consequences of [.  The group argued that 
“restricting the speech of one group or individual jeopardizes everyone’s rights because the same 
laws or regulations used to silence bigots [or in this case agitators] can be used to silence you.”201  
Thus, while the bill’s sponsors’ intentions may be valid, the vagueness and strictness of the bill 
threaten to infringe upon valid expressions of free speech.   
 From a precedential standpoint, the bill also runs counter to the trend toward more free 
speech rights and autonomy for university students.  The Court in Dixon began the shift away 
from allowing universities to act in loco parentis towards their students.  As this shift continues, 
the government should not assume that role.202  Indeed, the Dixon Court held that the 
governmental power to expel students is not unlimited and cannot be arbitrarily exercised.203  As 
such, it is reasonable to extend this holding to a vague law threatening expulsion for undefined 
actions.  
Looking back at Tinker, the idea that “[t]he classroom is peculiarly the marketplace of 
ideas” and requires “leaders trained through wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas … 
[rather] than through any kind of authoritative selection,” is especially relevant.204  Regardless of 
what virtues the sponsors espouse, this bill represents a “kind of authoritative selection” of what 
exchanges of ideas will be acceptable on campuses.205  Furthermore, even if some authoritative 
body should have the power to regulate disruptive speech, that body should not be an outside 
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force.  Rather, precedent suggests that the most capable body would be the campus 
administration itself.   
For example, in Southworth, Justice Souter’s concurrence espoused the belief that 
“protecting a university’s discretion to shape its educational mission” represented an important 
First Amendment consideration.206  Martinez went further, advocating for a deferential approach 
where the Court’s judgment would not substitute for the “on-the-ground expertise and experience 
of school administrators.”207  Rather, the Court elected to defer to the university and its 
determinations about the most efficient way to encourage “tolerance, cooperation, and learning 
amount students.”208  The Court made this decision despite having some possible misgivings 
regarding the wisdom of the policy.209    
The United States Supreme Court decided university administrations were more qualified 
to determine First Amendment issues on campus.  In doing so, they stressed the importance of 
the insider perspective.  While state assemblies may be closer to the universities in their states 
than the Supreme Court, they still represent an outsider perspective.  While it is important to 
safeguard every student’s First Amendment right to free speech, university officials with an 
acute understanding of their campuses should craft the policies.   
 Overall, if campuses are to continue operating as the “marketplace for ideas,” then state 
legislatures must allow those ideas to continue flowing freely, without intimidation or 
interference.210  Circumstances may arise where some students’ free speech rights are being 
negatively affected.  In these cases, these legislators should defer to the “on-the-ground expertise 
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and experience of school administrators” to deal with the problem as they see fit, consistent with 
higher constitutional principles.211   
IV. Conclusion 
 There is a real problem in this country with suppression of opposing viewpoints on 
college campuses.  While the beliefs and arguments of provocateurs like Milo Yiannopoulos may 
be crude and controversial, the students who invite such commentators to public campuses still 
have a right to hear these viewpoints.  As the ACLU succinctly says, “speech that deeply offends 
our morality or is hostile to our way of life warrants the same constitutional protection as other 
speech because the right of free speech is indivisible.”212  To address this problem, campuses 
should work towards crafting and promoting policies based on the idea that the answer to 
controversial speech is more speech.  Universities can find ways to bring more speakers to 
campus to counter and challenge controversial viewpoints.  The real answer to controversial 
speech should be more speech to defend against it. 
 Recently, Gettysburg College demonstrated the potential for such policies to 
accommodate both controversial speech and those opposed to it without having campuses 
descend into violence or censorship.  On May 3, 2017, the Gettysburg chapter of the Young 
Americans for Freedom invited Robert Spencer to speak on campus.213  Spencer, an author and 
blogger, co-founded the American Freedom Defense Initiative, which organized the “Defeat 
Jihad” poster campaign.214  Spencer has drawn criticism and accusations of Islamophobia, and 
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the week before visiting Gettysburg College he was shouted down by students at the University 
of Buffalo.215  Understandably, the days leading up to his Gettysburg visit were tense, and some 
called upon President Janet Morgan Riggs to disinvite Spencer.  Instead, the college invited 
another speaker the week before Spencer’s visit.216  Dr. Todd Green, Associate Professor of 
Religion at Luther College, spoke about professional Islamophobia, and proceeded to debunk 
several common themes espoused by professional Islamophobes.217  Dr. Green concluded by 
suggesting three ideas to avoid Islamophobia.218  As part of a question and answer period, a 
student asked President Riggs, who was in attendance, about the decision not to disinvite 
Spencer.219  President Riggs responded that  
I do want to remind you that this is part of the deal this week.  It’s not to have one 
speaker here, but to have someone here that I hope will provide all of you with the 
toolbox to respond to what’s coming next.  That was the point of having this lecture 
tonight.  I am not interested in cultivating a community of fear … That is a way to come 
together.  It’s not protesting the speaker, but it’s demonstrating solidarity with the 
Muslim members of this community … I think that’s what we can do to counter the fear 
that a speaker like this can bring to this community.220 
 
Additionally, the college planned a Muslim Solidarity Rally to take place simultaneously to 
Spencer’s event as a constructive channel for protestors to express their opposition to Spencer 
and support for Muslim members of their community.221 
 The decisions to invite Dr. Green to offer a preemptive rebuttal of Spencer’s views, and 
organize a protest event students could participate in paid off.  Spencer’s appearance came and 
went without disruption, violence, or censorship.222  Rather, those that chose to attend seemed 
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willing to allow him to speak, even if they still did not agree with him.  “I’m interested in 
hearing what he has to say,” reported sophomore Luca Menicali beforehand, “Going in, I know 
what my viewpoints are, and I will critically analyze what he has to say.”223  Speaking for the 
organization that invited Spencer, YAF President Scott Moore declared, “[i]t surpassed 
expectations really.  There were no violent disruptions, no protests.  I think everything went as 
well as it could have.”224  Using this as a blueprint, other colleges and universities can learn from 
the example set forth by Gettysburg College.  By providing speech that debunks controversial 
speech, administrations can lessen the animosity that professional provocateurs seek to stir on 
their lecture circuits.  Additionally, by organizing university-sanctioned means to express protest, 
administrations can lessen the chance for the type of sporadic violence seen at Berkeley.  Done 
right, policies like these can successfully walk the line between allowing controversial speech 
and showing support and solidarity for students feeling attacked. 
However, the answer is not the Wisconsin Campus Free Speech Act.  Between its 
academic neutrality requirement, rigid disciplinary system, and vague descriptions of what 
constitutes prohibited, disruptive speech, the Act will only foster an atmosphere of fear and 
paranoia.  It could result in using the disciplinary board as a means to silence the other side.  
Furthermore, the Act runs counter to the long judicial trend of affording administrations and 
students more autonomy with First Amendment free speech.  To allow such an Act to exist 
suggests that the Wisconsin Assembly is better suited than university administrators to decide 
matters of constitutional speech.  Going forward, the best course may be to stress and promote 
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the importance of free speech for all students and viewpoints, trusting that university officials, 
professors, and students will find a way to protect these important constitutional interests.  
